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Deliverable 3.1   First Survey of Theory on Differentiated Charging; Formulation of  
                            Hypotheses and Methodological Framework 
Executive Summary 
The objective of this deliverable is to develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of differentiated 
pricing schemes in transport markets.  The scope of the study is limited to the contribution of economic 
theory; a subsequent deliverable will focus on the behavioural theory.  The background economic 
theory is documented in a previous deliverable and is used as a starting point here to define 
hypotheses for the further analysis in the DIFFERENT project. 
 
Economic theory provides a contribution along two main lines.  The first contribution concerns the 
formulation of the optimal framework (the normative approach) for transport charges differentiation.  It 
is reached pursuing economic efficiency, a concept derived from welfare economics, according to 
which transport charges (prices) should be equal to marginal social costs in order to obtain maximum 
social welfare.  According to this theory, prices should be equal to marginal social cost (throughout the 
economy) to achieve this goal. 
 
The second contribution of economics addresses various difficulties in the application of the marginal 
cost concept, due to technological, institutional and political reasons, leading to deviations from first-
best pricing rules, i.e. towards second-best pricing approaches.  This approach moves from a 
normative approach (how transport charges should be in order to ensure welfare maximization) 
towards a positive approach (how transport charges actually are in order to take account of several 
constraints). 
 
The normative approach focuses in a first step on how pricing schemes should be defined as a 
function of the price setting agents, their aims, resource cost structures and general demand 
properties.  The aims of the agents involved can range from the very general (e.g. economic efficiency 
which comes down to welfare maximisation) to the very case specific (e.g. profit maximisation).  
Sometimes, an aspect of welfare is considered only (e.g. the environment), but the focus can also be 
limited to subgroups of the users (e.g. equity). 
 
Cost structures enter the game where large economies of scale exist.  Such a situation is frequently 
observed in transport markets which typically require robust infrastructure investment (roads, ports, 
airports as well as rail infrastructure).  Such a situation is likely to result in monopolistic tendencies, and 
marginal cost pricing will lead to deficits.  Another resource cost related issue is the implementation of 
an institution to collect the differentiated price.  Such an institution comes at a significant cost, so that 
as a result a simplified pricing scheme may be preferable. 
 
Demand side parameters play an important role in the determination of optimal pricing schemes when 
significant differences exist in price elasticities over consumer subgroups.  Also the existence of 
barriers to competition can induce differentiated pricing schemes. 
 
Taking the different parameters together results in a first-best scheme that is typically highly 
differentiated along many behavioural dimensions. 
 
In a second step the normative framework focuses on behavioural responses to a differentiated pricing 
scheme.  The point here is that the degree of differentiation may have an impact on the efficiency of 
the pricing scheme as well as on its acceptability.  As the scheme becomes more and more complex, a 
significant decision making cost is experienced by the user.  Taking into account this decision cost 
leads to an optimal degree of differentiation that is lower than what a first-best outcome suggests.  
Other considerations regarding behavioural responses include how acceptability may depend on 
misunderstandings on who is actually paying the bill as well as which exemptions exist - exemptions 
that typically have an adverse effect on the effectiveness of the price measure.  Elasticities can provide 
indicative and useful answers to the questions about the effectiveness of a policy measure.  However, 
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 policy makers must realise that the elasticity of some measure does not exist: elasticities of travel 
demand very much depend on the contexts. 
 
The normative approach has been illustrated in past research by modelling exercises which mainly 
focus on pricing schemes motivated by traffic congestion and to a lesser degree environmental 
damage by emissions.  The suggested modelling frameworks allow simulating different pricing 
scenarios featuring varying degrees of differentiation.  A measure of relative efficiency can be obtained 
by comparing welfare increases (or another objective variable) to a first-best optimized scenario. 
 
The bottleneck model provides a simple representation of peak load congestion and has received 
much attention in literature.  Significant welfare gains are obtainable even with a rather simple tolling 
scheme.  
 
For transport emissions simulation of the degree of detail requires a more elaborate modelling 
framework (including stock composition which requires for a dynamic modelling setup).  Past research 
indicates that state-of-the-art vehicle technologies have a rather small external emissions cost which 
limits the potential welfare gain of differentiated pricing.  Moreover, the current level of fuel taxes is too 
high to allow for further reduction of CO2 emissions in a cost-efficient way in road transport markets (in 
fact these taxes could be considered as a severe market distortion), further limiting the potential of 
environmental pricing schemes. 
 
The positive approach describes the impact of policy makers and interest groups on the differentiated 
price structure.  Special Interest Groups (SIGs) are interfering in the political field in order to gain as 
many advantages as possible for their members.  Theoretical contributions in this field focus on the 
provision of information and campaign contributions. 
 
Past research indicates that for the transport sector, SIGs will certainly interfere in the political process 
in favour of their members.  Their main concern is (according to the existing research) to achieve a 
certain degree of regulation, which guarantees the skimming of rents.  This means that most of the 
SIG’s activities are concentrated on imposing regulation and hence a certain price level.  Laffont’s 
contribution to the modelling literature indicates that when a pricing policy is already implemented the 
activities of the SIGs will centre not only on the tariff level, but also on the tariff structure, that is on the 
type of differentiation. 
 
A policy-maker maximizes his personal utility but at the same time she/he takes into account also 
normative elements such as consumer surplus or more general welfare.  SIGs will try to influence the 
political process and so to implement a policy according to their own preferences.  SIGs favour of 
course regulation, but they will also try to affect the price level and/or the price structure. 
 
The increasing number of well informed citizens, however, induces policy makers to be very careful.  
For the SIGs, the job becomes more difficult and more refined ways of influencing the policy makers 
are developed in order to still enhance the welfare of their members. 
 
An overview of the DIFFERENT case studies provides a state-of-the-art of the implementation of 
differentiated pricing schemes.  The overview is based on information collected through a factsheet 
form that is based on the methodological framework developed. 
 
The factsheet allows identifying the different dimensions of each case study which are relevant for 
success or failure of the different cases.  These factsheets are however only a preliminary presentation 
of the case studies which will receive more attention in a next step in the DIFFERENT project when the 
different cases will be analysed. 
 
